The Legal Standard
What the law and USCIS guidance require
The two-step framework comes from Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010), which drew a bright line between the counting stage and the merits stage. The court held that “neither USCIS nor an AAO may unilaterally impose novel substantive or evidentiary requirements beyond those set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5,” and explained that considerations bearing on standing — there, whether the research community had reacted to a petitioner's articles — “might be relevant to the final merits determination of whether a petitioner is at the very top of his or her field of endeavor,” but “are not relevant to the antecedent procedural question of whether the petitioner has provided at least three types of evidence.” 596 F.3d at 1121. Importing the merits question into the count is the error Kazarian identifies.
District courts have applied that line directly to the conflation move. In Rijal v. USCIS, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (W.D. Wash. 2011), aff'd, 683 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2012), the court held that “satisfying three of them is merely an evidentiary threshold,” and that “[t]he inquiry into sustained acclaim is part of the ‘final merits determination,’” not the threshold criteria. Id. at 1346–47. In Eguchi v. Kelly, No. 3:16-CV-1286-D (N.D. Tex. June 23, 2017), the court found USCIS's reasoning “impermissibly conflates its step one analysis with step two,” explaining that “[t]he submission of evidence is a procedural question,” and that at step one the petitioner “is not obligated to prove that his salary illustrates that he is one of a small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor and enjoy sustained national or international acclaim.”
Zizi v. Cuccinelli, No. 20-cv-07856-SVK (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021), addresses the original-contributions version of this objection head-on. The court held that the agency “appears to have conflated the step 1 (evidentiary) and step 2 (merits) inquiries under Kazarian,” and — decisively for the drafting practice — that the Government “cites no legal authority for its proposition that an applicant must ‘demonstrate how his work already qualified as a contribution of major significance’ to satisfy his initial evidentiary burden under Kazarian.” In other words, prospective or not-yet-field-wide significance can still satisfy the criterion at the threshold; the “already achieved major significance” demand belongs, if anywhere, at final merits.
None of this abolishes the second step. The Fifth Circuit in Amin v. Mayorkas, 24 F.4th 383 (5th Cir. 2022), upheld the two-step framework and confirmed that meeting three criteria does not by itself establish eligibility — a genuine final-merits determination remains legitimate. The point is narrower: the two inquiries must stay in their lanes. What crosses the line is answering the step-two question (top of field, sustained acclaim, field-wide major significance) at the step-one count, or never conducting the step-two analysis after refusing to count criteria on step-two grounds.
Both steps are governed by the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard — “more likely than not.” Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375–76 (AAO 2010), holds that “[e]ven if the director has some doubt as to the truth, if the petitioner submits relevant, probative, and credible evidence that leads the director to believe that the claim is ‘more likely than not’ or ‘probably’ true, the … petitioner has satisfied the standard of proof.” The Policy Manual applies that standard at both steps. Demanding proof approaching certainty at the threshold therefore compounds the conflation with a second error — applying a quantum of proof higher than preponderance, which the AAO's own precedent forecloses.
Governing authorities
- 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2)
- The definition of extraordinary ability — where the “small percentage … very top of the field” language actually appears. It is definitional, not an independent step-one prong to be proven for each criterion.
- 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)
- The initial-evidence criteria. Step one asks only whether evidence objectively meets at least three of these (or a one-time major award) — not whether it proves top-of-field standing.
- Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115, 1119–22 (9th Cir. 2010)
- Source of the two-step framework; bars “novel substantive or evidentiary requirements” at the “antecedent procedural question” and reserves top-of-field considerations for the final-merits determination (pin cite 1121).
- Rijal v. USCIS, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1346–47 (W.D. Wash. 2011), aff'd, 683 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2012)
- Meeting three criteria is “merely an evidentiary threshold”; the “sustained acclaim” inquiry belongs to the final-merits step, not the threshold criteria.
- Eguchi v. Kelly, No. 3:16-CV-1286-D (N.D. Tex. June 23, 2017)
- USCIS reasoning that a criterion must itself show “very top of the field” at step one “impermissibly conflates its step one analysis with step two”; submission of evidence is a procedural question.
- Zizi v. Cuccinelli, No. 20-cv-07856-SVK (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021)
- The agency “conflated the step 1 (evidentiary) and step 2 (merits) inquiries” and cited “no legal authority” for requiring proof that work “already qualified as a contribution of major significance” to meet the initial burden.
- Amin v. Mayorkas, 24 F.4th 383 (5th Cir. 2022)
- Confirms the two-step framework is valid and that meeting three criteria does not automatically establish eligibility — the boundary showing that a genuine step-two analysis is legitimate, only its importation into step one is not.
- Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375–76 (AAO 2010)
- Preponderance of the evidence (“more likely than not”) governs; “even if the director has some doubt,” probative and credible evidence satisfies the standard — so near-certainty may not be demanded at either step.
- USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 6, Pt. F, Ch. 2
- Sets out the two-step review under a preponderance standard and instructs that at step one officers “should not yet make a determination” about whether the person is at the very top of the field or has sustained acclaim.
- AILA Practice Pointer, “Golani, Scripps, and Using Judicial Decisions in the O and EB-1 Context” (posted Sept. 10, 2024; AILA Doc. No. 24091003)
- Explains that the preponderance standard is a guardrail: USCIS may not use the final-merits analysis to upend or dismiss, without specific reasons, probative evidence it found met step one.