The EB-1A framework is the two-step Kazarian analysis: the petitioner first satisfies at least three of the criteria at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3), and USCIS then conducts a final-merits determination on the record as a whole. Both steps are governed by the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard — a fact is established when the record shows it is "more likely than not" true. See Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375–76 (AAO 2010). Applying a higher standard than preponderance is legal error, and the criterion stage is limited to whether the submitted evidence objectively meets the regulatory description — no more.
The controlling limit on this objection is that USCIS may not add to the regulation. In Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010), the court held that "neither USCIS nor an AAO may unilaterally impose novel substantive or evidentiary requirements beyond those set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5." Decades earlier, Buletini v. INS, 860 F. Supp. 1222, 1231 (E.D. Mich. 1994), stated the principle directly: "It is an abuse of discretion for an agency to deviate from the criteria of its own regulation." Federal courts have applied that rule to strike each of the common glosses — the invented media element for awards, the "entire organization" requirement for leading/critical role, the same-employer comparator for salary, and comparative "exceed all others" tests for original contributions.
Criterion by criterion, the regulatory text carries none of the added elements. For awards, § 204.5(h)(3)(i) requires only a "nationally or internationally recognized" prize "for excellence in the field of endeavor"; Buletini confirms "National recognition of the award is sufficient," and the USCIS Policy Manual lists media coverage as one relevant consideration, not a requirement. For original contributions, § 204.5(h)(3)(v) asks for "contributions of major significance" with no "already realized" element; Zizi v. Cuccinelli, No. 20-cv-07856-SVK (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021), rejected the position that a petitioner must "demonstrate how his work already qualified as a contribution of major significance" to meet the initial burden, and the Fifth Circuit in Amin v. Mayorkas, 24 F.4th 383, 393–94 (5th Cir. 2022), located the actual inquiry in field-wide impact and adoption, not timing. For leading or critical role, § 204.5(h)(3)(viii) says "organizations or establishments" — Rubin v. Miller, 478 F. Supp. 3d 499, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), and Chursov v. Miller, No. 18-cv-2886 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2019), hold that a role for a department or research group qualifies. For high salary, § 204.5(h)(3)(ix) says "in relation to others in the field"; the proper comparator is the average earner in the same position, not top earners or a single similar company. See Berardo v. USCIS, No. 3:19-cv-01796-SB (D. Or. Oct. 20, 2020); Muni v. INS, 891 F. Supp. 440, 446 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
The Policy Manual reinforces the same guardrail. It instructs that an officer "may not limit the kind of evidence the officer thinks the person should be able to submit and deny the petition if that particular type of evidence ... is absent, if the person nonetheless submitted other types of evidence that meet the regulatory requirements for the classification." USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 6, Pt. F, Ch. 2. On distinguished reputation it cautions that "the relative size or longevity of an organization or establishment is not in and of itself a determining factor," and it names a "principal or named investigator for a department" as a qualifying leading role — foreclosing an organization-wide gloss. Where an officer's position contradicts the agency's own manual, that inconsistency is itself a recognized ground for reversal. See Chursov, supra (USCIS bound by its Policy Manual).
- 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3)(i), (v), (viii), (ix)
- The enumerated criteria. The text names a "nationally or internationally recognized" award, "contributions of major significance," a role for "organizations or establishments," and salary "in relation to others in the field" — and contains none of the added glosses (no media element, no "already realized" element, no "entire organization" requirement, no same-employer comparator).
- 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(2)
- Defines extraordinary ability as "a level of expertise indicating that the individual is one of that small percentage who have risen to the very top of the field of endeavor" — the standard the added requirements displace.
- Kazarian v. USCIS, 596 F.3d 1115, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2010)
- "Neither USCIS nor an AAO may unilaterally impose novel substantive or evidentiary requirements beyond those set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5." Also the anti-surplusage answer: had the agency intended a threshold requirement, "such records would have been included among the detailed substantive and evidentiary requirements" already listed.
- Buletini v. INS, 860 F. Supp. 1222, 1230–31 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
- "It is an abuse of discretion for an agency to deviate from the criteria of its own regulation." National recognition of an award is sufficient, and the regulation "makes no requirement that an alien detail the qualifications necessary to achieve the alien's salary."
- Rubin v. Miller, 478 F. Supp. 3d 499, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
- Inventing an "entire organization" requirement for the leading/critical-role criterion is an abuse of discretion: "As neither the AFM nor case law imposes any such requirement, this finding constitutes an abuse of discretion." Department- or group-level roles qualify.
- Chursov v. Miller, No. 18-cv-2886 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2019)
- A leading role within a distinguished research group satisfies § 204.5(h)(3)(viii); requiring a role at the parent institution "as a whole" was arbitrary and capricious, and USCIS is bound by its own Policy Manual.
- Scripps Coll. v. Jaddou, No. 4:23CV3075 (D. Neb. Dec. 12, 2023)
- "It is well-established that USCIS may not unilaterally impose a novel evidentiary requirement." The regulations and Policy Manual "do not require the petitioner to show the beneficiary's contributions must exceed that of other researchers or professors in the field."
- MRC Energy Co. v. USCIS, No. 3:19-CV-2003-K (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2021)
- The judging criterion, § 204.5(h)(3)(iv), does not require that the petitioner be invited to serve as a judge or judge outside job duties: "This statutory language does not require that Mr. Ludick was invited to serve as a judge or that he served as a judge outside of his job."
- Zizi v. Cuccinelli, No. 20-cv-07856-SVK (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021)
- Rejects an "already realized" gloss on major significance: the government cited no authority that an applicant must "demonstrate how his work already qualified as a contribution of major significance" to meet the Step 1 burden; prospective significance can qualify.
- Amin v. Mayorkas, 24 F.4th 383, 393–94 (5th Cir. 2022)
- Locates the original-contributions inquiry in field-wide impact and adoption "beyond the applicant's own employer," not in temporal framing — confirming that "major significance," not an invented "already-implemented" element, is the governing question.
- Berardo v. USCIS, No. 3:19-cv-01796-SB (D. Or. Oct. 20, 2020); Muni v. INS, 891 F. Supp. 440, 446 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Grimson v. INS, 1995 WL 134755 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
- The high-salary comparison is to the average earner in the same position in the field — "[t]he appropriate test compares the petitioner's salary with the average salary of others in the same position" (Berardo) — not to top earners or a single similar company; treating only "all-stars or the League's highest-paid players" as qualifying is an "overly grudging interpretation" (Muni).
- USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 6, Pt. F, Ch. 2
- An officer "may not limit the kind of evidence the officer thinks the person should be able to submit" where other qualifying evidence is present; "the relative size or longevity of an organization ... is not in and of itself a determining factor"; a "principal or named investigator for a department" can hold a qualifying leading role.
- Matter of Chawathe, 25 I&N Dec. 369, 375–76 (AAO 2010)
- Sets the governing burden — preponderance of the evidence, "more likely than not" — that an added, heavier evidentiary element impermissibly displaces.