Selective awards in economics include the John Bates Clark Medal (rare and a strong indicator on its own), Frisch Medal, Sloan Research Fellowship, NSF CAREER for economists, Sargan Prize, Carlo Alberto Medal, Leontief Prize, ASSA dissertation awards, Review of Economic Studies tour selection, NBER fellowships at the doctoral level (Aging, Health, Innovation), and best-paper awards at major economics conferences. Field-society early-career awards (Econometric Society, Society for Economic Dynamics, American Economic Association) have supported this criterion when selectivity is documented. For policy economists, awards from the Fed System, IMF research awards, and World Bank research recognition can carry weight when external selection is established. Internal company awards are typically discounted unless externally judged.
Membership in the American Economic Association is open and not selective. Election as a Fellow of the Econometric Society has supported this criterion in past cases, as has fellowship in the Society of Labor Economists, the National Academy of Public Administration, and similar selective bodies. NBER affiliation by program (Public Economics, Labor, Health, Innovation, Asset Pricing) is invitation-based for many programs and has supported this criterion when documented as selective. CEPR fellowship operates similarly. Whether a specific membership qualifies depends on the documented bylaws and the officer.
Coverage of economists in outlets such as The Economist, Bloomberg, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, the Financial Times, NPR, Vox's policy coverage, and policy-research outlets such as VoxEU, Project Syndicate, and Brookings or Hoover commentary, can support this criterion when it focuses on the economist's research rather than on broader policy debates. Federal Reserve Bank publications about the candidate's research are sometimes credited; in-house policy newsletters tend to be discounted. For applied tech economists, coverage in tech media (Wired, MIT Tech Review, The Information) addressing the candidate's specific work has sometimes supported this criterion.
For economists, this criterion is typically well-supported. Peer review for journals (American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economic Studies, AEJ field journals, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Labor Economics, RAND Journal), grant review for NSF Economics, NIH (for health economists), the European Research Council, and policy-research foundations, NBER summer institute discussant roles, ASSA program committee service, editorial board appointments, and external dissertation review have all supported this criterion. Documenting selectivity and stature of the work judged tends to help more than volume. Officers vary in how they treat routine peer review.
This is typically the load-bearing criterion. For academic economists, strong records combine independent citations through Web of Science, Scopus, or RePEc (with separation of self-cites), follow-on research and grants by other scholars, textbook treatment, working-paper engagement on NBER and SSRN, and expert declarations from senior independent economists addressing field-level impact. For policy and central-bank economists, original contributions often draw from research that influenced specific policy decisions (FOMC briefings, IMF Article IV consultations, regulatory rulemaking), with documentation through policy memos, citations in official reports, and statements from senior policymakers. For applied tech economists, original contributions draw from internal research with documented business or policy impact (auction mechanism design that shifted marketplace behavior, A/B test programs that informed platform policy, pricing or matching innovations), patents on auction or pricing mechanisms, and rare published work. The "major significance" determination is openly discretionary and varies meaningfully across officers.
For academic economists this criterion is usually straightforward. Officers look at journal stature within economics: AER, QJE, Econometrica, JPE, ReStud at the top, AEJ field journals and field-leading specialty journals (Journal of Finance, JFE, RFS for finance; Journal of Labor Economics; Journal of Public Economics; Journal of Econometrics) at the next tier. Working papers on NBER and SSRN are sometimes credited where citation engagement supports it. For policy and applied economists, publication patterns differ: central-bank working papers, Federal Reserve Board FEDS series, IMF working papers, and World Bank Policy Research working papers are typically presented as research-output evidence with documentation of their standing. Whether any specific publication record suffices depends on the rest of the petition.
Display of work at exhibitions
This criterion rarely fits economists in the regulatory sense. Conference presentations and seminar talks are typically not exhibitions. We generally do not press this criterion.
For academic economists, this criterion typically draws on roles such as Department Chair, Center Director (for instance, Stigler Center, Becker Friedman Institute affiliations, Bendheim Center, Cowles Foundation), named-chair appointments, journal editorial leadership (editor or associate editor at top journals), NBER program director or co-director roles, and CEPR program leadership. For policy economists, head-of-research roles, division-chief positions at the Fed, IMF, or World Bank, FOMC briefing roles, and IMF Article IV mission chief roles can support this criterion. For applied tech economists, named research leadership (head of marketplace economics, head of pricing science, principal economist with cross-team scope) at firms such as Amazon, Uber, and Airbnb has supported this criterion when responsibilities and impact on company-wide decisions are documented. Whether the role is read as critical depends on the documentation.
For academic economists at most institutions, this criterion is rarely the strongest, though business school finance and economics faculty and named chairs sometimes generate sufficient differentials. For applied tech economists, senior-economist and principal-economist compensation at top tech firms (including base, bonus, RSU, and PSU components) frequently supports this criterion when benchmarked against the right comparison set (industry economists at the equivalent level rather than academic economists or general "economist" BLS data). For senior policy economists, compensation rarely supports this criterion. Benchmark choice materially affects the analysis, and most petitions do not lead with this criterion unless the candidate is in the applied-industry sub-profile.
Commercial success in the performing arts
Does not apply to economists.